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Social Mechanisms and Social Causation 
 
The history of an idea from thought to action is (…) clearly more than one step. St. M. 
Elkins, Slavery (1976, 172) 
 
Abstract 
 
 
“The aim of this paper is to examine the notion of social mechanisms by comparison with the 
notions of evolutionary and physical mechanisms. It is argued that social mechanisms are based 
on trends, and not lawlike regularities, so that social mechanisms are different from mechanisms 
in the natural sciences. Taking as an example of social causation the abolition of the slave trade, 
the paper argues that social mechanisms should be incorporated in Weber’s wider notion of 
adequate causation in order to achieve their explanatory purpose.”  
 
  
  
I. Introduction. Recent discussions of causation in the social world have concentrated on the 
notion of mechanisms. The notion of a ‘social mechanism’ which brings about an event has a lot 
of similarity, according to some writers, with the notion of a physical mechanism in the natural 
world. It is held that the identification of an appropriate mechanism - either based on 
deterministic or statistical regularities (Bunge 1996; 1997; 2004; Hempel 1965, 231-43; 
Papineau 1978) or causal powers (Bhaskar 1978; Manicas 2006) -, is conducive to obtaining a 
naturalist explanation in both the social and the physical world. This alliance seems to bring 
social scientific explanations much closer to explanations in the natural sciences, which has 
always been the aim of the naturalistic model of the social sciences. Other writers, however, have 
cautioned that social mechanisms are not based on such structures, since they only express 
patterns, tendencies and trends and allow for exceptions (Elster 1998, 2007; von Wright 1971, 
Ch. IV; Nagel 19612, Ch. 13). Nevertheless, in these approaches social mechanisms are 
important in attempts to causally explain happenings in the social world. Some typical 
mechanisms – economic, psychological, or social – are the maximization of utility, the demand 
and supply mechanism, the avoidance of cognitive dissonance, mechanisms of social control and 
belief-formation mechanisms, like self-fulfilling prophecies.  
But to which extent do social mechanisms explain social events? And what is the range of their 
explanatory power? Some authors argue that there are other aims in the social sciences, like 
prediction and understanding, which cannot be attained by appeal to mechanisms (Reiss 2007). 
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A simple identification of causal mechanisms in the physical and social world neglects two 
important elements in social action: first, the role of statistical patterns and, second the role of 
human agency. Any social mechanism will be based on trends and will be constituted by the 
mediation of minded persons (Manicas 2006, 2). In order to understand the role of social 
mechanisms this paper proposes to proceed by comparisons and contrast with physical 
mechanisms and evolutionary mechanisms. Each case will be based on a specific case study: the 
formation of rainbows illustrates the role of physical mechanisms in deterministic explanations; 
the coloration of male guppies will illustrate the role of evolutionary mechanisms, which support 
statistical explanations; finally the abolition of the slave trade (1807) will provide an illustration 
of social causation, in which human agency plays a major part. The upshot of this comparative 
analysis will be that social mechanisms are very different from both physical and evolutionary 
mechanisms, and yet will still allow to adopt a position of weak naturalism in the social sciences.  
 
II. Mechanisms in General. There has recently been a considerable amount of discussion 
regarding the nature of mechanisms. These discussions are placed within the ‘systems tradition’, 
which is an alternative to Hempel’s DN and IS models of explanation (Hempel 1965; cf. 
Leuridan 2010). Even within the approach of mechanistic explanations, a distinction is drawn 
between etiological and constitutive explanations (Salmon 1984; Craver 2006). An etiological 
mechanistic explanation is a cause-effect relation, whereby a phenomenon (explanandum) is a 
consequent occurrence of an event or process or state, which can be traced to a set of antecedent 
causal conditions. A constitutive mechanistic explanation explains a phenomenon by describing 
an underlying mechanism. The mechanism consists of component parts and their organized 
activities (Craver 2006, 108Fn). Much of the effort of the ‘systems tradition’ has concentrated on 
explaining the mechanisms in operation in biology and neuroscience.  
For instance, Machamer et al. describe biological mechanisms as ‘composed of both entities 
(with their properties) and activities. Activities are products of change. Entities are the things that 
engage in activities’ (Machamer et al. 2000, 13; italics in original). They stress that mechanisms 
work by the regular interaction between activities and entities (Machamer et al. 2000, 4-6). Their 
characterization of mechanisms falls within the ‘systems approach’, since in a system the 
components are linked by regular interactions.  Many scientists and philosophers concur that 
both the natural and social sciences are concerned with systems, so that it seems appropriate to 
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conceive of mechanisms in terms of systems. The components, which are needed to explain the 
formation of biological and physical phenomena and the causal dimension of this explanation are 
well captured in the following definition of a mechanism: 
 
A mechanism for a behaviour is a complex system that produces that behaviour by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be 
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. (Glennan 2002, 
S344)   
 
Craver also stresses that ‘mechanisms are entitities and activities organized such that they exhibit 
the explanandum phenomenon’ (Craver 2006, 6; italics in original). This is a preliminary sketch 
of a constitutive model and Craver spends much effort in refining this model to a normative 
account of constitutive explanations. In particular he stresses that on his account mechanistic 
explanations need to satisfy a number of criteria, which include the importance of the notion of 
organization: ‘mechanisms involve the active, spatial and temporal organization of different 
components’; and the importance of constitutive relevance: ‘both the mechanism and its 
components and activities must be relevant to the explanandum – they are mutually manipulable’ 
S’s Ψ-ing 
X11-ing 
 
Figure 1: S’s Ψ-ing is explained by the organization of entities {X1, X2…Xn} and activities 
{1, 2…n}. (Adapted from Craver 2006, 7)   
 
X33-ing 
 
X22-ing 
 
X44-ing 
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(Craver 2006, 161-2; Figure 1). More recent accounts emphasize the ‘interdependence among a 
mechanism’s components’, its’ ‘jointness’. (Fagan 2012) Let us now investigate how such a 
general notion of mechanism applies to the social, biological and social world respectively. We 
shall see that the types of ‘interactions between parts’ play a crucial role in the distinction 
between natural and social mechanisms. 
 
II.1 Physical Mechanisms.  Consider the formation of rainbows as an example of a physical 
mechanism. Rainbows are the result of a combination of several processes: a) refraction of 
sunlight at the boundary between the air and the airborne water droplets; b) reflection of light in 
the interior of the drops and c) interference of the refracted and reflected light beam. The angle 
of deviation, δ, differs for different ‘colours’ which make up sunlight. Observers see a rainbow 
on the opposite side of the sun in the sky, the antisolar point. When the sun is high in the sky, the 
curvature of the rainbow is small but large when the sun is low in the sky. The highest curvature 
in the shape of a crescent is achieved at dawn and dusk, respectively. A rainbow can be modelled 
as a circle of angular radius θ and centred on the antisolar point (Figure 2). (Cf. Pincock 2011)  
A primary bow has a radius of 42.5º and a width of 1.5º with respect to the antisolar point. It is 
caused through a combination of a double refraction and a single reflection of the light rays in a 
Figure 2:  The 
antisolar point and 
radius of primary 
rainbow. 
Source: 
http://eo.ucar.edu/
rainbows 
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water drop. Dispersion then causes the widening of the ray with the sequence of colours from 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet (from outside to inside) (Figure 3). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The formation of a rainbow involves a purely physical mechanism, involving laws of refraction 
and reflection and some boundary conditions, like the position of the sun in the sky and the 
Figure 3:  Double 
refraction and single 
reflection in a water 
drop, giving rise to a 
primary rainbow; δ = 42º 
 
Source: Wikimedia 
Commons 
  
Figure 4:  Sketch of the paths of rays in  
secondary rainbows, with double refraction 
and double reflection; δ = 52º 
 
Source: Stöckler (2000), 323 
 
2 
2 
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source of the water vapour (rain, a fountain or the bow of a ship). Such mechanisms have 
attracted much interest in the literature since they can be linked to the notion of causality.  
 
Let us consider how the above characterization of mechanisms fits this particular example. First, 
the mechanism, which produces a rainbow, forms a complex system: the system consists of a 
number of components (relata) and these components are made to interact through lawful 
regularities (relations). These interactions are invariant with respect to their space-time locations 
– rainbows form in the same manner irrespective of the place and time of their formation (but 
boundary conditions determine the curvature of the bow); and the interactions are ‘variable-
relating’, which means that the relata can be treated as variables in the models such that an 
intervention on one variable brings about a regular and predictable change in another variable to 
which it is functionally related.  For instance, the angle of deviation, δ, between the incoming 
and outgoing beams and for a m-fold reflection in the interior of the drop is: 
     22 m , 
(where ε is the angle of incidence and ε’ the angle of refraction; Figure 4). Then a change in the 
quantifiable parameters - m, ε, ε’ - will change δ from a primary to a secondary rainbow. Second, 
a number of relations can combine to produce the mechanism. This may happen in a linear 
fashion as in the current example or in a vectorial fashion, as in the causal explanation of 
planetary orbits in Newtonian physics, where the orbit is the vectorial sum of the first law of 
mechanics and the law of gravitation.  Thus in order to characterize a mechanism under the 
aspect of systems, we need a specification of the system components, the types of (lawlike) 
interactions between them and the specific boundary conditions, which specify the space-time 
location of the system. The definition could be narrowed down to mechanical macro-systems, in 
which case the relata are required to be observable macro-components and the relations between 
the variables are required to be physically traceable and lawlike. For instance, the collision of 
two billiard balls or the switching of railway tracks are physically traceable to ordinary observers 
in a way that solar radiation is not. But it may be difficult to draw a line between ‘traceable’ and 
‘non-traceable’ relations and to specify the interactions in purely mechanical terms. Machamer et 
al., whose focus is on biology, warn against thinking of mechanisms as ‘exclusively mechanical 
(push-pull) systems’ (Machamer et al. 2000, 2).   
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 Whilst in the formation of rainbows the invariant, variable-relating scientific laws are of a 
deterministic nature – and therefore constitute an example of constitutive mechanical explanation 
- this need not be the case, as a consideration of an evolutionary mechanism will show.  
 
II. 2 Evolutionary Mechanisms. As is well known, Darwin’s evolutionary theory is statistical in 
nature, which, in Darwin’s terms can be expressed by saying that features, which are 
advantageous to survival, tend to be preserved, whilst characteristics, which are injurious, tend to 
be eliminated. In contrast to a deterministic relation, a statistical relation therefore allows 
exceptions, where these exceptions do not constitute a violation of the statistical relation.   
In Darwin’s theory, natural selection is often treated as a mechanism, which consists of several 
components, and their interactions, extended in time. (Cf. Garson 2013)  Darwin accepted 
Malthus’s view that food resources grew arithmetically whilst populations grew exponentially. 
Darwin did not understand the genetic mechanism of heredity, but he accepted the principle of 
hereditary, isotropic variations of offspring from their parents (population thinking). Darwin 
rejected the Lamarckian idea of use-inheritance but he affirmed that among the offspring some 
will be born with favourable variations, other with injurious variations. Darwin also affirmed the 
principle of a constant struggle for survival. From these principles follows the statistical principle 
of natural selection: preservation of favourable variations and rejection of injurious variations, in 
a given environment. The evolutionary mechanism therefore unfolds over time, and yet, as the 
following example shows, involves an interaction of components parts.  
An interesting experimental confirmation of the principle of natural selection appears in a study 
of the predator preference for brightly coloured male guppies (Godwin and McDonough 2003, 
194-200). The researchers used the guppy and the blue acara cichlid fish as a model ‘prey-
predator system’ to demonstrate, in a controlled experiment, that the predator cichlids tended to 
attack, on average, the more brightly coloured male guppies, of equivalent size (in the ratio of 
3:1). The researchers made sure that the preference of the predator for more colourful males was 
not due to other factors, like size or movement. On the other hand, colourful patterns are an 
advantage in the mating game, since females clearly prefer the most colourful males. The male 
guppy therefore faces a dilemma. In a predator-free environment, the brightly coloured male has 
a better chance of mating success than the drabber male but in a predator-rich environment the 
brighter-coloured males run a greater risk of mortality from predation. On the principle of natural 
 8 
selection one would expect a statistically significant inverse relationship between colouration 
and high predation. This relationship has been experimentally confirmed (Endler 1980). When 
predators are introduced into guppy populations which had a weak predation intensity, the 
number and size of colour patches in adult male guppies gradually reduced over a few 
generations; when male guppies where transferred from a high-predation site into a low-
predation population the number and size of colour patches in males increased over a few 
generations.  
Therefore there exists a significant statistical correlation between predation intensity and 
colouration; furthermore the colouration of male guppies corresponds to varying levels of 
predation-intensity. Although statistical in nature, the evolutionary mechanism still allows the 
prediction of evolutionary phenomena, as the guppy experiment shows. It is an example of an 
etiological mechanistic explanation. The question now arises how these two types of 
mechanisms (deterministic and statistical) compare to social mechanisms.  
 
II. 3 Social Mechanisms. There are many definitions of social mechanisms (Gross 2009, 359-
66; Reiss 2007). Yet despite some differences between them, there are a fair number of 
similarities: the link between cause and effect in context-specific situations, and varying degrees 
of generality of mechanisms. A standard view in the philosophy of the social sciences is that a 
mechanism in the social sciences is to be understood as a pattern of behaviour, which is invoked 
to account for some observable change in the social world. A pattern can be understood as an 
arrangement of corresponding parts, held together by some underlying regularity. But patterns of 
behaviour also make reference to social agents, who intentionally engage in such behaviour with 
other agents. A pattern can explain change so that a social mechanism, as a pattern of behaviour, 
has causal force. According to Jon Elster social mechanisms are to be understood as ‘frequently 
occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown 
conditions or with indeterminate consequences’ (Elster 2007, 36). They allow us to predict the 
general direction of social events but not the magnitude of their change. M. Bunge points out that 
there are many social mechanisms because there are many social systems. Bunge suggests the 
following formal definition: 
We define a social mechanism as a mechanism in a social system. Since every 
mechanism is a process in some system, a social mechanism is a process involving at 
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least two agents engaged in forming, maintaining, transforming, or dismantling a 
social system (Bunge 1997, 447). 
 
Thomas Schelling suggests two possible characterizations of social mechanisms. Under the 
systems aspect he defines a 
social mechanism (as) a plausible hypothesis, or set of plausible hypotheses, that could 
be the explanation of some social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of 
interactions between individuals and other individuals, or between individuals and 
some social aggregate. (…)  
 
The second characterization puts more emphasis on social agency: 
Alternatively, a social mechanism is an interpretation, in terms of individual 
behaviour, of a model that abstractly reproduces the phenomenon that needs 
explaining (Schelling 1998, 32-3; italics in original). 
 
As can be seen from the examples and the definitions, a social mechanism need not be 
‘mechanical’. But Bunge, in opposition to Elster and Schelling, sees close similarities between 
physical and social mechanisms, between natural and social science and holds that  
the only condition for a mechanism hypothesis to be taken seriously in modern science 
or technology is that it be concrete (rather than immaterial), lawful (rather than 
miraculous), and scrutable (rather than occult) (Bunge 1996, 138).  
 
These definitions emphasize that social mechanisms apply to social systems, which have 
component parts (individuals, aggregates) between which some interactions take place, within a 
certain environment. Yet other definitions of social mechanisms, as indicated by Schelling, put 
the emphasis much more on social agents and their actions than on social systems. For instance, 
N. Gross proposes a pragmatist theory of mechanisms, according to which  
social mechanisms (are) composed of chains or aggregations of actors confronting 
problem situations and mobilizing more or less habitual responses (Gross 2009, 368; 
cf. Manicas 2006, 2). 
 
Gross claims that a pragmatist definition has certain advantages over more systems-based 
characterizations for the purpose of sociological explanations, because it views social 
mechanisms from the point of view of social actors. However, his definition does not radically 
change the philosophical perspective on social mechanisms. They are still seen as relations 
between actors, the problem-situations they attempt to solve, their habitual responses, which ‘in 
aggregate or sequentially bring about the I-O (input-output) relationship’ (Gross 2009, 368). In 
particular, the reference to ‘habitual responses’ to problem situations suggests a certain degree of 
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regularity, and a choice of pre-existing patterns, which individual social actors adopt. For 
instance, self-fulfilling prophecies can be viewed from the point of view of social actors as an 
enactment of pre-existing patterns of behaviour, which are available as belief-formation 
mechanisms, whether or not individual actors decide to embrace them. 
Although all agree that social mechanisms are context-specific, there are still sufficient 
similarities between social events to construct models of social mechanisms, which highlight the 
salient features of real mechanisms at work in the social world (Bunge 1997, 451; Stinchcombe 
1991, 375-6; cf. Sawyer 2004). The further question whether social mechanisms are empirically 
observable or are simply model assumptions, does not arise if we adopt Max Weber’s 
methodology of ideal types. The envisaged models of social mechanisms are as-if models or 
hypothetical models because they model social reality as if it existed only of the components of 
the model mechanism. For reasons, which will become clearer later, it is important to remember 
that Weber’s ideal type methodology is very close to this understanding of models of social 
mechanisms, since Weber’s ideal types can also be characterized as hypothetical or as-if models 
(Weinert 1996). It lies in the nature of models that they are able to model systems, which consist 
precisely of relata and their relations. As Weber emphasizes, however, such ideal-typical models 
must be subject to empirical tests. Ideal-typical models of social mechanisms can be thought of 
as idealizations of real mechanisms in the social world. 
At this stage two questions arise: 1) If social mechanisms are akin to mechanisms in the natural 
sciences, as some authors claim (e.g. Bunge, Hempel), what is the precise nature of these 
mechanisms, given that they always involve human agency? In order to tackle this issue, we first 
have to address the question of the type of regularities, which are operative in social mechanisms 
and whether they are similar or dissimilar to regularities underlying biological and physical 
mechanisms. We shall assume that both natural and social systems can be modelled as structures, 
consisting of relata and their relations. If there is a difference between natural and social 
mechanisms it boils down to the question of whether the interactions between social entities are 
based on lawful regularities in the same way as in natural mechanisms. This focus on patterns of 
interaction is justified because all the definitions considered above emphasize the importance of 
interactions between relata, whether the relata are biological entities, physical parameters or 
social agents.  
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 2) Even though human agency plays a constitutive role in social mechanisms (Manicas 2006, 2), 
social mechanisms have explanatory functions, since they are seen as hypothetical causal 
patterns of behaviour. It will then be interesting to ask how social mechanisms can explain 
events in history, in which ideas and agency played a causal part. For instance, for two centuries 
a general assumption prevailed in the Western world, say from 1550 to 1750, that the 
enslavement of people, in particular Africans, was a normal type of behaviour, justifiable by both 
economic and religious reasons. Yet a current of Enlightenment ideas developed, which 
eventually led to the passing of the anti-slave trading law in Britain (1807), which rendered the 
British arm of the slave trade illegal, although it did not stop the practice of slave-trading for 
many years to come. This suggests that ideas played a causal role in the abolition movement. The 
role of ideas in history has been particularly stressed by Weber. According to Weber (1948), 
ideas have the power to channel social action. Weber also developed a model of social causation.    
 
III. Mechanisms and General Trends. This section will first argue that the underlying 
regularities at work in social mechanisms are logically distinct from regularities in natural 
mechanisms so that we have to conclude that social mechanisms are logically distinct from 
natural mechanisms. And it will consider how social mechanisms can accommodate ideas and 
human agency? What effect does this have on the nature of social mechanisms? The abolition of 
the slave trade, as a case study in social causation, will highlight some particular features of 
social mechanisms. 
 
III. 1 Mechanisms and Regularities. According to Elster, mechanisms are ‘triggered under 
generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences’. Bunge characterizes the 
structure of social science explanations as consisting of a testable mechanismic hypothesis or 
theory, as well as value judgements and norms and circumstances, which together explain the 
explanandum (Bunge 1997, 443; Bunge 1996, 143). Although Bunge insists that mechanisms are 
inconceivable without laws, he concedes that  
in the social sciences, law and mechanism are necessary but insufficient to explain, 
because almost everything social is made rather than found. Indeed, social facts are 
not only law-abiding but also norm-abiding; and social norms, though consistent with 
the laws of nature, are not reducible to these, if only because norms are invented in the 
light of valuations – besides which every norm is tempered by a counternorm (Bunge 
2004, 197). 
 12 
 
The appeal to patterns of behaviour in the social world obviously refers to some kind of 
regularity, without which such patterns would be inconceivable. It is the nature of these 
regularities, which ultimately decides whether or not social mechanisms can be assimilated to 
natural mechanisms, because in mechanisms relata are held together by various types of 
interactions. It is the type of interaction, which determines which relata enter the system. As it 
turns out Bunge’s concession of the impact of human agency will have serious consequences for 
any attempt to assimilate social regularities with ‘laws’ in the sense of the natural sciences, either 
in a deterministic or statistical sense.  As Bunge emphasizes, there are no universal mechanisms 
known to the social sciences; rather social mechanisms are context-specific. But this recognition 
immediately implies that social mechanisms are variable and subject to change either due to 
accidental features or deliberate human intervention. But if social mechanisms are variable and 
subject to change, so must be the underlying social regularities. In physical mechanisms, the 
lawful regularities are invariant with respect to a change of the relata, as long as their validity 
remains within the appropriate domain of application. The physics of tennis remains the same 
whether the players are amateurs or professionals, whether the game is played in Andalusia or 
Zimbabwe.  Biological mechanisms are based on statistical regularities but these statistical 
regularities are still invariant with respect to a change of relata, and give rise to predictions. In 
social systems the regularity may not be invariant with respect to a change of relata; social 
patterns change between different cultures and communities. This aspect is particularly 
emphasized by the pragmatist approach to social mechanisms.  
These features constitute two significant departures from natural laws, either deterministic or 
statistical. 1) While humans can observe physical laws and employ them for the purpose of 
intervention in physical systems, neither the observation nor the intervention will change the 
regularity itself. But social regularities can both be modified and be reversed as a result of 
deliberate human intervention. Thus, they exhibit the characteristics of trends, rather than 
genuine laws (Weinert 1997; cf. Nagel 1961, 451, 466-8). 2) Social mechanisms are context-
specific in a dual way: They can either be modified by changing the component parts (relata) or 
by changing the underlying trend (relation). In each case they are dependent on particular 
circumstances (norms and values change); and thus changing a social mechanism and changing 
a trend requires knowledge of social conditions. But dependence on initial conditions is the 
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logical characteristic of trends. Trends are simply inductive generalizations from a number of 
initial conditions. Trends are descriptive of a large number of cases, which allow for genuine 
exceptions. Logically, trends are dependent on initial conditions in a way that genuine laws are 
not. (Popper 1957) An indicator of this dependence is that a change in initial conditions – like a 
change in value systems or a change in legislation – will change the very nature of the social 
pattern. In order to achieve this reversal or modification, the initial conditions, which trigger the 
social mechanism, must be known.  
 
This dual aspect of trends has an effect on the nature of social causation: we need to consider a 
cluster of conditions, including initial conditions, human agency and social mechanisms when 
we consider a case of social causation. Hence there exists a much tighter connection between 
social mechanisms and ‘circumstances’ than for mechanisms in the natural world.  A natural 
mechanism is typically governed by lawful regularities, which are stated without initial 
conditions, since the mechanism holds in their absence. The initial conditions only instantiate the 
lawful mechanisms. We saw this at work in the description of the formation of rainbows.
1
  
Social mechanisms must therefore be logically distinct from mechanisms in the physical and 
biological sciences because they are based on trends (or trend-like patterns) rather than lawful 
regularities between quantifiable parameters, and they depend on human agency. The question 
now arises whether social mechanisms are sufficient to explain a significant social event, like the 
abolition of the slave trade. 
 
III.2 The Abolition of the Slave Trade.
2
 Which events caused the abolition of the slave trade? 
There can hardly be any doubt that the abolition of the slave trade in Britain in 1807 must be 
regarded as an effect of some antecedent causal conditions, since what had been regarded as the 
                                               
1 Mechanisms are employed in many sciences and many discussions concentrate on mechanisms in the biological 
sciences. Although biological laws are often statistical in nature, and possibly much more ‘local’ – restricted to 
certain parts of the solar system - than physical laws, they too cannot be reversed by human intervention or 
otherwise. And the distinction between initial conditions and laws also holds for biological laws, cf. Sober (2008, 
363). When we speak of a cluster of (antecedent and subsequent) conditions, in a causal context, we have Weber’s 
model of causal causation in mind; for further discussion see Weber (1949); Weinert (2007). 
2 Although it is convenient to speak of the ‘abolition’ of the slave trade, historical accuracy demands to point out 
that Britain did not abolish the slave trade. Rather, Britain declared the British arm of the slave trade illegal under 
British law. The slave trade continued until the middle of the 19th century. Nor was Britain the first country to ban 
the slave trade. Portugal, the original superpower of the slave trade, abolished it in 1761. Revolutionary France also 
declared the French slave trade illegal (1794), only to reintroduce it under Napoleon. However, as Britain was a 
world power at that time, the ‘abolition’ of 1807 was a significant act with vast symbolic implications.  
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‘normal running of things’ became an abnormality. According to the above-mentioned account 
we should therefore be able to identify some social mechanism, which can explain the effect. 
However, what we find in the literature on the slave trade is a cluster of conditions, which 
historians regard as the most adequate conditions. They are considered to have the explanatory 
power to explain the effect. But historians often disagree on which particular conditions should 
be regarded as causally effective in bringing about the abolition. The cluster of conditions, which 
can be found in the literature, can be summarized as follows: 
 Economic conditions. Anti-abolitionists often stressed the importance of the slave trade 
for the economic prosperity of Britain. It is certainly the case that individual traders 
became wealthy from the slave trade and that cities like Bristol, Liverpool and London 
prospered. For instance, the Duke of Clarence – the son of King George III – declared 
in the House of Lords (1799) ‘that the present British Capital in the West Indies, is 
equal, upon a fair calculation, to ONE HUNDRED MILLION STERLING! A sum, my 
Lords, which demands your most serious consideration, before you consent to the 
Abolition of that Trade without which it could not exist’ (quoted in Pinfold 2007, 365; 
capital letters in original). However, pro-abolitionists often pointed out that the 
economic benefits of the slave trade were exaggerated. According to contemporary and 
modern calculations, the slave trade was never particularly profitable, since the average 
profit margin on the trade was not greater than 9% at any one time (Ansty 1975, Ch. 2; 
Davis 1966). The ‘unprofitability’ of the trade was highlighted by contemporary pro-
abolitionists when they pointed out 
o that the price of African slaves rose steadily in the 18th century; 
o that tobacco and sugar would be cheaper to produce if either the plantation 
owners employed free labour (a point repeated by Adam Smith) or if 
plantations were established on African soil. 
Today’s historians seem to have come to a consensus that the slave trade was not 
abandoned for purely economic reasons. It should be stressed that this reassessment of 
the likelihood of antecedent conditions occurred on the strength of evidence in terms of 
historical records. 
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 Religious reasons. Quakers, like John W. Wesley, became an essential source of anti-
slavery sentiments (Reddie 2007). In the past the concept of original sin had been used 
to justify slavery and the domination of one race over the other.  
 
The essence of sin and slavery was a denial of self-sovereignty, a negation of the 
natural ability to will that which was just and lawful. All men were condemned by 
Adam’s sin to sweat for their bread; and some men were required (…) to sweat more 
than others. Sin and the necessities of Providence qualified the belief in the equality of 
men before God, and sanctioned the enslavement and transportation to America of 
millions of Africans (Davis 1966, 292; cf. Elkins 1976, 34-5). 
 
Slavery was often justified by an evocation of biblical stories like Noah’s curse3. But a 
change in the meaning of the concept of sin and an emphasis on human freedom and 
human responsibility towards history, which marked the Enlightenment period, was 
bound to have an effect on attitudes towards slavery.     
Since sin was traditionally thought of as a kind of slavery, and external bondage was 
justified as a product of sin, any change in the meaning of sin would be likely to affect 
attitudes toward slavery (Davis 1966, 292). 
 
This change occurred: 
 
In the eyes of the more radical millenarians, the universe was suddenly transformed 
from a fixed hierarchy of moral gradations into an irreconcilable division of evil and 
righteousness, of darkness and light, of freedom and slavery (Davis 1966, 297). 
 
And it had its own logic: 
 
(The) inner logic of Quakerism (…) stemmed from the basic proposition that Christ 
died for all men, so postulating a fundamental equality between them, and from the 
call to Quakers to love all men (Ansty 1975, 203). 
 
 Enlightenment reasons. Quakerism appeals to values, which took on great significance 
in the Enlightenment period. In the eyes of modern historians of the slave trade, the 
Enlightenment period was crucial because it promoted secular ideas of liberty, of 
freedom from suppression and unjustified doctrines of supremacy, as well as the 
natural rights doctrine which helped to create a new image of humanity. Kant expressed 
this new attitude in his famous motto of the Enlightenment: sapere aude. In Max 
Weber’s terminology, the Enlightenment ideas helped channel social action in the 
direction of the ending of the slave trade. It is not the case that all Enlightenment 
                                               
3 The view was that Blacks were descendents of Ham, who had had the misfortune of seeing his father, Noah, naked. 
Noah condemned the sons of Ham to perpetual bondage (Blackburn 1989, 35). 
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thinkers condemned the slave trade. And early complaints about the viciousness of the 
slave trade reach as far back as the 16
th
 century (Las Casas, 1542) and continued 
throughout the 17
th
 century (A.Vieira, 1660; J. B. Du Tertre, 1667). But the opposition 
of famous intellectuals like J. J. Rousseau, Ch. Montesquieu, G. Raynal, A. Condorcet, 
F. Hutcheson and A. Smith provided an important impetus to a change in mental 
attitudes. This change was very much a grassroots affair with ordinary people signing 
literally thousands of petitions and ‘boycotting’ the sale of sugar and other plantation 
goods. 
 
It is important to stress that this cluster of conditions could be used in favour as well as against 
the slave trade. For instance the Bible could be used to justify the existence of the slave trade.
4
 
Equally humanitarian reasons were often used to condone the slave trade. It was said by anti-
abolitionists that Africans met better living conditions in the colonies than at home and that the 
trade should be continued, as the Duke of Clarence argued in Parliament, ‘for the sake of 
humanity’ (quoted in Pinfold 2007, 346; cf. Elkins 1976, 193-222).  
This illustrates the indeterminate consequences of which Elster speaks. The emphasis on 
Enlightenment ideas stresses the role of ideas and agency in the change of events and illustrates 
Weber’s thesis that while ideas do not determine social events they have the power to channel 
these events into certain directions. 
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very 
frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which acting has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 
‘From what’ and ‘for what’ one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, ‘could 
be’ redeemed, depended upon one’s image of the world (Weber 1948, 280; cf. Elkins 
1976, 170-5). 
 
Nevertheless this set of conditions – especially religious and Enlightenment attitudes more than 
economic considerations – may be regarded as necessary for the change of attitudes, which 
occurred in the 18
th
 century but not as sufficient for the abolition of the British arm of the slave 
trade. The change in ideas about human nature was a necessary condition, which channelled the 
pro-abolitionist movement towards abolition. But the translation of ideas into social action 
requires certain social mechanisms. The parliamentary procedures prior to 1807 may be regarded 
                                               
4 In 1788 a certain Raymund Harris of Liverpool published his Scriptural Researches on the Licitness of the Slave 
Trade, Shewing its Conformity with the Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion (Pinfold 2007, 175-248). 
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as the social mechanism, which provided the sufficient condition for a change in legislation in 
Britain. By parliamentary procedures is meant the extended process, through which the pro-
abolitionists gained a majority vote for the abolition bill. This includes the grassroots movements 
against the slave trade, such as consumer boycotts of tea and tobacco and thousands of petitions 
sent to parliament by ordinary people. What happens when appropriate mechanisms are missing, 
has been studied in the case of American abolitionism. According to a student of the abolition 
movement in the US, the American anti-slavery movement in the 1830s suffered precisely from 
a lack of plausible mechanisms, which were capable of converting feelings of guilt and moral 
repugnance into concrete social reform (Elkins 1976, 170-93). How, then, are Enlightenment 
ideals and mental attitudes to be included in social mechanisms? For ideas to become vehicles of 
social action they need some form of institutionalization or pattern; in the language of social 
action theory, they need to instigate a chain of aggregate behaviour and habitual responses in the 
face of a problem situation. As M. Weber and St. Elkins have shown, ideas as such are 
powerless; they only channel social action into particular directions but they rely on the existence 
or formation of patterns in order to become effective. In the current example, Enlightenment 
ideas were the initial conditions, on which social mechanisms depended for input.  
The role of parliamentary procedures in the abolition of the slave trade suggests a refinement of 
the role of trends in social mechanisms. Parliamentary procedures are fairly reliable and regular 
processes, which are more stable than normal societal trends. Trends, therefore, come in degrees 
of stability. Political procedures are often stable, reliable patterns of social action. However, the 
logical point about trends remains: even stable patterns of human action are reliant on initial 
conditions and susceptible to reversibility, in a way that laws of nature are not.  
The Enlightenment ideas can then be regarded as necessary conditions. Necessary conditions are 
normally regarded as conditions in the absence of which some consequent event cannot occur. 
For instance in the absence of oxygen no fire can break out. But the presence of oxygen does not 
mean that a fire will occur because more conditions will need to be present for a fire to start. This 
situation seems to have obtained in the United States in the 1830s. A sufficient condition is 
normally understood as one in the presence of which some subsequent event will occur. For 
instance, in the presence of rain the streets will get wet. But rain is not a necessary condition 
since a broken water pipe will also wet the streets. Recall from the above definitions that social 
mechanisms are seen as concrete processes between interacting social entities, which have the 
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power to bring about change. Applied to the slave trade, we observe the linkage between social 
mechanisms and initial conditions, which characterizes the trends underlying social mechanisms: 
the abolitionist cause would be unthinkable without the prior change in mentality. The 
Enlightenment ideas, which inspired the abolitionists, constituted the initial conditions under 
which they employed the parliamentary machinery. The Enlightenment ideas were instrumental 
in specifying the aim of their parliamentary attempts to obtain a bill, which would end the British 
arm of the slave trade. But without parliamentary procedures, abolition may not have taken 
place, as the situation in the US in the 1830s confirms. Thus, as Max Weber saw, we need to 
consider the cluster of necessary and sufficient conditions to causally understand a social event, 
like the abolition of the slave trade. As Stinchcombe writes, ‘theories of mechanisms at the 
individual or situational level in social science may be of no use outside boundary conditions.’ 
(Stinchcombe 1991, 385) That is to say, social mechanisms model patterns of behaviour under 
conditions of idealizations. The boundary conditions supply the concrete data under which the 
abstract mechanism must operate in order to explain concrete events. As Stinchcombe suggests, 
social mechanisms are a ‘subtype of models’. (Stinchcombe 1991, 376; cf. Bunge 1997; 
Hedström/Swedberg 1998, 15-6) They involve degrees of approximation and explain aggregate 
types of behaviour. The models explain aggregate behaviour as if the model consisted only of the 
components and their relations as represented in the model. In other words, social mechanisms 
can be understood as ideal-typical models, in Weber’s terminology, since they specify a set of 
conditions under which they hold on aggregate.  
What the consideration of the abolition of the slave trade suggests is that etiological and 
constitutive explanation must be linked for the Enlightenment ideas channelled social action into 
a particular direction but a political mechanism was needed to turn the ideas into law. In Weber’s 
discussion of causation in the social sciences there is no strict distinction between social 
mechanisms and initial conditions. In Weber’s terms a set of such conditions constitutes the most 
probable conditions under which the explanandum occurred. If the explanandum is the abolition 
of the slave trade then the cluster of religious and philosophical ideas – generally the ideals of 
the Enlightenment – which occurred prior to 1807, and the political procedures to turn ideas into 
action, are the most likely conditions to account for the explanandum. Once such a set of 
conditions is identified, we have an adequate causal explanation of the event, E. Weber speaks of 
‘adequate’ causation because he is aware that causal explanations in the social sciences do not 
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take the strict form they take in the physical sciences. Yet he insists that ‘it is possible to 
determine, even in the field of history, with a certain degree of certainty which conditions are 
more likely to bring about an effect than others.’ (Weber 1949, 183) In Weber’s model of 
adequate causation the social mechanisms are only part of the set of antecedent conditions, 
which are the most likely determinant conditions for some given social event, E. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, Weber’s model does not require that the mechanisms are based on some lawful, 
say statistical regularities. Mechanisms can be based on deterministic relations, statistical 
regularities or social trends. As these constitute degrees of regularity, both the explanation of 
phenomena and their prediction are possible. Even trends in the social world are stable enough 
go give rise to a limited predictability and explanation of human behaviour. Thus, although 
social mechanisms are logically weaker than natural mechanisms, they are strong enough to 
support a weak naturalism in the social sciences.  
 
VI. Conclusion. On Weber’s model of adequate causation, then, the abolition of the British arm 
of the slave trade occurred because new ideas about humanity began to change the perception of 
slave trading. While Enlightenment ideas channelled social attitudes to the slave trade into a 
particular direction, the pro-abolitionists needed to turn this humanist direction of thinking into 
concrete political action, which required the employment of appropriate parliamentary 
procedures. Of course this combination of antecedent conditions did not necessitate the outcome. 
But given the outcome – the abolition of the British arm of the slave trade (1807) – the 
antecedent conditions (Enlightenment ideas and parliamentary procedures) are the most likely 
conditions, which adequately explain the abolition of the slave trade. In the case at hand, the 
causal patterns were not triggered under ‘unknown’ conditions and the consequences were 
probable rather than merely indeterminate. These considerations suggest that a social mechanism 
cannot be employed without knowledge of the antecedent boundary conditions, under which it is 
supposed to occur. This result is due to the fact that social mechanisms are based on patterns, 
trends and human agency, rather than lawful regularities, as in natural mechanisms. Although 
both social and natural mechanisms can be modelled as systems, which consist of relata and their 
relations, their decisive difference resides in the logical status of the underlying regularities, 
which bind the relata together. Social mechanisms are based on patterns of variable degrees of 
stability, which are reversible and inductively generalized from initial conditions. Physical and 
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biological mechanisms are based on laws of nature, which only require initial conditions for their 
instantiation. Social mechanisms are therefore logically distinct from physical mechanisms. It is 
therefore social mechanisms, and more generally a cluster of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
which must explain causation between social events.   
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